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Downing: Downing: Continuing Power of Cultural Tradition and Socialist Ideology:

COMMENT
THE CONTINUING POWER OF
CULTURAL TRADITION AND
SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY: CROSSCULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
INVOLVING CHINESE, KOREAN,
AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS
Panmunjom, Korea -Maj. Gen. James B. Knapp, negotiatorfor
the United Nations Command (UNC), was waiting for Maj. Gen. Ri
Choonsun of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea to
propose a recess.
They sat there, arms folded,for 4 1/2 hours. Not a word. Finally,
Gen. Ri got up, walked out and drove away.'
In investigating the processes and difficulties of negotiation, scholars have
passed through three stages of development: first, they collected and collated
rough impressions from negotiators and diplomats; second, they attempted to
construct models to explain these differences; and third, they tried to refine these
models to account for the myriad subtleties that individuals bring to the
negotiation context.2 Scholars proposed various models as part of the second
phase, including prominently a model based upon the idea of the homogeneous
"rational person" used by economists.3 Such models contain an oversimplified
concept of the negotiator by assuming that these individuals share an
understanding of the "optimal" negotiating strategy and only deal with intra-group
disputes.4 Therefore, consistent with the third stage of intellectual investigation,
attention turned to refining these proposed models by examining other factors
which affect negotiation styles and outcomes. 5 Looking into the characteristics

1. Silent Hostility at Panmunjom, Evening Bull., Philadelphia, Apr. 11, 1969, at '10.
2. R. JANOSIK, NEGOTIATION THEORY: CONSIDERING THE CULTURAL VARIABLE IN THE JAPANESE
AND AMERICAN CASES 1 (1983).

3. Id. at 2-4.
4. See id. at 9-10.
5. See, e.g., R. JANOSIK, supra note 2; Poortinga & Hendriks, Culture as a Factorin International
Negotiations: A Proposed Research Project from a Psychological Perspective, in PROCESSES OF
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 203 (F. Mautner-Markhof ed. 1989); Wang, Some CulturalFactors
Affecting Chinese in Treaty Negotiation,in CULTURAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 97 (R.
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that a society shares seems particularly valuable in advancing the model in a
systematic way. Indeed, because some investigators see "cultural or cognitive
differences as being the major source of conflict in the international system,"6 this
line of investigation may create understandings with practical importance in
increasing the successful resolution of international conflicts.
This Comment approaches the issue of "cultural" factors in international
negotiations by examining cross-cultural negotiation in which the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and Korea (North and South) have dealt with Western
nations. First, the cultural heritage of these nations appears important. Confucian
ideals, for example, have had a tremendous impact on China for thousands of
years,7 and they continue to influence modern societies. Second, more recent
political tradition, namely the "ideology" of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, has also had
an impact on the conduct and goals of conflict resolution today. As one scholar
states, the "Chinese view of negotiation, so different from, and even incompatible
with,... the Western view, rests on a Marxist-Leninist base." This Comment
tries to answer such questions as whether these two "traditions" reinforce,
contradict, or merely run parallel to each other, but will also take up more
practical concerns such as how they influence negotiations with members of other
cultures, specifically the United States. The Comment will not argue that culture
is the only, or even the most important, factor that affects such cross-cultural
negotiations. Instead, it will examine how cultural tradition and political ideology
affect negotiation style, how culture and ideology cause difficulties in negotiations
with the United States, and it will make some suggestions on how these
difficulties might be alleviated.
I. A DEFINITION OF CULTURE
A. Finding a Definition
While most observers agree that psychological and historical factors influence
individuals and their ability to interact in negotiations with opponents from other
traditions, "culture" remains a very difficult term to define in a usable form. 9 For

Anand ed. 1981); J. Ward, More Than a Chinaman's Chance: A Historical Case Study Analysis of
the Chinese National Negotiating Style (March 1989) (unpublished manuscript available at Harvard
Archives).
6. D. DRUCKMAN, HUMAN FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL

ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 34 (1973) (emphasis added). Pye confirms this view, stating
that "[u]nquestionably the largest and possibly the most intractable category of problems in SinoAmerican business negotiations can be traced to the cultural differences between the two societies."
L. PYE, CHINESE COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATING STYLE 20 (1982).
7. See R. FOLsOM & J. MINAN, LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
READINGS, AND MATERIALs 3 (1989).

COMMENTARY,

8. Jong-Hwan, How the North Korean Communists Negotiate: A Case Study of the South-North
Korean Dialogue of the Early 1970's, 8 KOREA & WORLD AFF. 610, 625 (1984).
9. See, e.g., R. JANosI, supra note 2, at 13; Poortinga & Hendriks, supra note 5, at 205.
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example, Fisher labeled it a "vague and fuzzy concept.""° Because culture can
carry such a variety of connotations, the incautious analyst may attribute a wide
variety of negotiation difficulties to this catch-all category without scrutinizing
them carefully." Consequently, scholars have12 tried to narrow the concept of
culture by creating more workable definitions.
The working definition this Comment utilizes derives from one proposed by
Jervis and includes an individual's ideology, understanding of history, and beliefs
inherited from the environment.' 3 The first of these, when considered in the
Chinese and Korean context, consists of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political
doctrine.' 4 In these societies, ideology forms an integral part of "culture" in the
broad sense. The second and third items in Jervis' list form what this comment
will call "cultural heritage" or "cultural tradition" and include elements of
pre-communist society such as Confucian values. Both sets of these sets factors
affect cognitive processes, perspectives, and emotional reactions of Chinese and
Korean negotiators.
Other scholars have distinguished these two categories in explaining the
negotiation styles of these countries. For instance, Wang states that "[o]ne may
examine the implications of a state's cultural heritage or . . . its ideology to
identify its views [on] treaty negotiation."' 5 Two schools of thought have
evolved from these categories. Analysts who base their explanations of
negotiation behavior on the influence of communist ideology are generally either
Cold War American negotiators, 6 or hard line anti-communists from South
Korea and Taiwan. 7 Although there remains a real risk that these commentators8
do not demonstrate an unbiased understanding of their perceived "enemies,'
their claims do not seem completely unfounded. Marx, Lenin, and Mao
propounded ideas and prescriptions relative to negotiation behavior, and none can

10.

G.

FISHER, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1980).

11. Poortinga & Hendriks, supra note 5, at 204.
12. See, e.g., id. at 206 (discussing three approaches to the characterization of culture); 0. FISHER,
supra note 10, at 11 ("patterns of psychological behavior that go with shared culture"); R. JANOSIK,
supra note 2, at 18 ("ways of behavior or techniques of solving problems which ... have a high
probability of use by the individual members of a society") (quoting Wallace, IndividualDifferences
and Cultural Uniformities, 750 AM. Soc. REv. 7 (1952)); Hofstede, CulturalPredictorsof National
NegotiationStyles, in PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 5, at 193 ("collective
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another").
13. See generally R. JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(1976).
14. Lubman describes "ideology" as a "view of the world and a program for changing it," and
gives Maoism as an example of such an ideology. Lubman, Mao andMediation: PoliticsandDispute
Resolution in Communist China, in R. FoLsOM & J. MtNAN, supra note 7, at 92.
15. Wang, supra note 5, at 97.
16. See, e.g., C. JOY, How COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE (1955); W. VATCHER, PANMUNJOM: THE
STORY OF THE KOREAN MIITARY ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS (1958).
17. See, e.g., NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, A WHITE PAPER ON SOuiH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN

KOREA (1988); Jong-Hwan, supra note 8; Yin, On Communist Negotiations, 16 ISSUES & STUD. 13
(1980).
18. J. Ward, supra note 5, at 6.
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doubt the pervasive influence of communist ideologies on the societies of North
Korea and the PRC. 9 In addition, these critiques persisted even after the cold
war stereotypes of these nations lost favor.20
A second group of scholars arose from a second category of cultural factors
which focus on historical traditions. A growing number of analysts look at
21
historical traditions as a tool in explaining differences in negotiating behavior.
They quickly point out that such factors cannot completely explain observed
differences in national negotiating behavior, 22 but an examination of these
influences can contribute to the overall understanding of, and help to systematize,
apparently unrelated negotiation practices.
B. Some Difficulties with the Definition
Some analysts might object to this Comment's division of explanatory factors
into cultural heritage and ideology, claiming that Chinese and Korean societies
have distinct cultural traditions and have interpreted the socialist system of thought
in differing ways.2 While these national differences should not be ignored, the
two societies remain far more similar to each other than to the American society
with whom they interact in negotiations. For centuries, the proximity and
interaction of China and Korea caused a sharing of fundamental values, and more
recently socialist thought has strongly influenced North Korea just as it has
Chinese society. In addition, even if differences between the societies of China
and Korea exist, strong similarities traceable to similar cultural roots may explain
observed negotiation behavior.24
A second stumbling block rests on the fact that the communist governments
of the PRC and North Korea attempted to transform their societies by stamping
out traditional values and replacing them with progressive socialist ones. For
example, these governments urged struggle and change, and such campaigns as the
Cultural Revolution tried to eliminate "old thinking,"' where Confucian values
dictate harmony. However, although over forty years of communist rule led to
much societal change, the traditional values and beliefs survived to a great degree.

19. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 17, at 27 (quoting Lenin).
20. See, e.g., NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., B. DEMENTE, CHINESE ETIQUETrE & ETHICS IN BusINEss (1989) [hereinafter
CHINESE ETIQUE'rE]; B. DEMENTE, KOREAN ETIQUETTE & ETHIcs IN BusINESS (1988) [hereinafter
KOREAN ETIQUETrE]; Shenkar & Ronen, The Cultural Context of Negotiations: The Implications of
Chinese Interpersonal Norms, 23 J. APPLIED BEHAv. SC. 263 (1987); Solomon, Friendship and
Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style, in NATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLES 1 (H. Binnedijk ed. 1987);
Wang, supra note 5.
22. Wang, supra note 5, at 98.
23. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, How Not to Lose the Trade Wars by Cultural Gaffes, 18 SMITHSONIAN 145
(1988) (cautioning not to generalize perceptions of the quite different Asian peoples).
24. Some scholars have proposed that every nation may not have a unique culture; cultural
heritages may span national boundaries. See, e.g., R. JANOSIK, supra note 2, at 19.
25. R. FOLsoM & J. MINAN, supra note 7, at 11; Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 264.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/7

4

1992]

Downing: Downing: Continuing Power of Cultural Tradition and Socialist Ideology:
CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS

First, the very nature of culture makes it deep-seated, unconscious, and stable over
time. 26 Changes can occur, but they are much more likely to take the form of
gradual evolution than sudden shifts, especially if imposed from above. The
societies of the PRC and North Korea resisted many of the changes that the
communist governments sought. 27 Second, the traditional heritage of a society
tends to meld into changes attempted by visionary leaders. Psychologists suggest
that humans tend to hold onto beliefs learned at an early age and then fit new
information into the existing pattern. 28 This model provides a cognitive basis for
the observed phenomenon that revolutionary ideals often absorb the preexisting
value system to a great extent. Third, because the government imposed socialist
ideological values in erratic ways, it lessened the impact on traditional values.
The uncertainty caused by frequent changes in the "correct" political values
undermined the effectiveness of the new ideas, and "technocrats" who learned to
distrust the volatile proclamations and policies of the high officials have replaced
most of Mao's supporters. 29 Folsom confirms this assessment in his description
of the PRC:
The weight of Chinese history could not have made of Chinese
communism anything but a new tool for the fulfillment of specifically
Chinese cultural and political yearnings. . . . The Chineseness of
China's communism is not to be under-estimated; Marx is more remote
in his foreignness than Confucius across the gap of millennia.30
Thus, although the separation of the cultural heritage and ideological influences
may prove problematic, perhaps impossible to do definitively, both sets of factors
have a recognizable affect on current negotiation behavior. This Comment will
attempt to draw out relationships between the two despite these conceptual
problems.
A third source of potential difficulty lies in the observation that a kind of
common culture has developed among professional negotiators. Such norms could
make conclusions as to the causes of certain behavior problematic. For example,
Glenn and Witmeyer admit that the common profession culture of United Nations
diplomacy may have distorted the empirical results of a study on cultural styles
of persuasion. 3 In addition, Druckman suggests that a close-knit society of

26. Hofstede, supra note 12, at 193.
27. Lubman, supra note 14, at 106. The Confucian model of behavior (h) has been historically
favored in Chinese society and continues today in the PRC. R. FOLSOM & J. MINAN, supra note 7,
at 4.
28. G. FIsHER, supra note 10, at 13-14.
29. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 264-65; see also R. TUNG, U.S.-CHINA TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 9-10 (1982).
30. R. FOLSOM & J. MiNAN, supra note 7, at 10.
31. Glenn, Witmeyer & Stevenson, CulturalStyles of Persuasion,1 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL.
52, 59. Hofstede also notes that professional negotiators may share a common culture of symbols and
common habits, facilitating successful bargaining results. Hofstede, supra note 12, at 194.
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foreign ministers has grown due to similarity of background and education and
screening processes within the profession. a2 In cases of the PRC and North and
South Korea interacting with the United States, this objection seems less
relevant.3 a First, a significant portion of the negotiators in the studies utilized in
this Comment cannot be considered "professional." 4 The common culture
proposed seems to apply less well to business negotiations, particularly between
small American companies and lower bureaucratic cadres, than to national,
diplomatic meetings. Second, a review of the literature reveals Chinese and
Korean negotiators still maintain differences when compared with their Western
counterparts.35 Thus, even if a common "negotiation culture" has begun to
develop in some parts of the world, the subjects of this comment do not seem to
have participated in its development to any great extent.
Finally, in assessing the effects of cultural heritage and ideology, the analyst
must prevent other intervening variables from clouding the causal relationship.
Wang points out that such other variables exist, stating that "it would be hardly
rewarding to attempt to find answers for all questions regarding the People's
Republic of China ... exclusively in terms of its Communist ideology any more
than in terms of its cultural tradition. 36 Janosik confirms this assessment,
stressing that the analyst must separate individual personalities of the negotiators
and the structural framework of the society from cultural background.37 Simple
national interest may also affect the behavior and attitudes of negotiators. For
example, the Republic of China on Taiwan and the PRC have roughly similar
perceptions of and policies toward Tibet despite their differing ideological
backgrounds.38 While the analysis in this Comment will take this caution into
consideration, the argument does not rule out the possibility of finding some
relationships between cultural factors and negotiation behavior. In fact, cultural
heritage and ideology have had a significant impact on Chinese and Korean
negotiation practices.

32. D. DRUCKMAN, supra note 6, at 68.
33. Solomon notes that although China has shown a partial adaptation to diplomatic conventions
of the West, Cultural traditions and communist ideology still play an important role in Chinese
negotiation style. Solomon, supra note 21, at 2.
34. See, e.g., CHINESE EnQuErE, supra note 21; KOREAN ETIQuETrE, supra note 21; L. PYE,
supra note 6; R. TUNG, supra note 29.
35. See, e.g., Chang, Settlement of the Macao Issue: DistinctiveFeaturesof Beijing'sNegotiating
Behavior, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253, 277 (1988); Lubman, Negotiations in China: Observations
of a Lawyer, in COMMUNICATING WITH CHINA 66-67 (R. Kapp ed. 1983).
36. Wang, supra note 5, at 98.
37. R. JANOsIK, supra note 2, at 13-14.
38. Wang, supra note 5, at 98. For an additional example, see Weiss, The Negotiating Style of
the People's Republic of China: The Future of Hong Kong and Macao, 13 J. Soc. POL. & ECON.
STUD. 175, 180 (1988). The United Kingdom believed that it would be unable to militarily intervene
to protect Hong Kong from the PRC, and it considered its trade relations with the PRC more important
than the benefits it gained from its relationship with Hong Kong. Id. at 180. Under these
circumstances, pure considerations of national interest had a strong effect on the manner and outcomes
of its negotiation with the PRC. See id.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY ON NEGOTIATIONS

The behavior of Chinese and Korean negotiators derives from a composite
tradition which includes cultural and historical elements as well as the influence
of Communism.39 These influences affect the participants' choice of techniques
as well as their conceptions of the process as a whole. ' " The causal factors
examined here intimately interrelate with each other. Confucian values form a
complete system whose many elements support and confirm each other and
Chinese socialist thinkers incorporated many of these ideas into their version of
communism." Despite the blurring of distinctions, this Comment will treat them
as distinct causes for the sake of clarity and then examine the ways in which they
interrelate.

A. The Effects of CulturalHeritage on Negotiation Behavior42
1. Harmony
One basic aspect of the traditional Confucian value system lies in its
emphasis on harmony.43 The ideal relationship remained conflict-free and took
into account the interests and reactions of the entire group. 44 In resolving
conflicts, the restoration of harmony remained more important than achieving
some notion of abstract justice; 45 yielding (jang)and compromise were virtuous
because they prevented friction and restored a harmonious condition.4 6 These
behavioral ideals affect negotiations today.
First, the concept of harmony explains the way that many individuals in
Chinese and Korean societies conduct negotiations. Because a person making an
emotional outburst tends to disrupt the harmony of the situation, negotiators will
seldom reveal any feelings, and others showing strong emotions may arouse the

39. Solomon, supra note 21, at 2.
40. R. JANOSIK, supra note 2, at 18-19.
41. See supra notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text.
42. Although traditional Chinese culture contained many competing philosophies, including
Taoism, Buddhism, and Legalism, "Confucianism is most clearly identified as the foundation of
China's great cultural tradition, and Confucian values still provide the basis for the norms of Chinese
interpersonal behavior." Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 266. Consequently, this paper will focus
on Confucianism.
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id.
45. Wang, supra note 5, at 101; see CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS 115 (D. Lau trans. 1979) ("The
Master said, 'In hearing litigation, I am no different from any other man. But if you insist on a
difference, it is, perhaps, that I try to get the parties not to resort to litigation in the first place.").
46. R. FOLSOM & J. MINAN, supra note 7, at 3-4; Lubman, supra note 14, at 90, 92; see
CONFUCIUS, supra note 45, at 75. "To be importkinate with one's lord will mean humiliation. To be
importunate with one's friends will mean estrangement." Id.
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distrust or antipathy of individuals who hold the traditional values.47 A North
Korean general during the Panmunjom armistice talks displayed a rather crude
example of this idea: if a fly were to land on his face, he would not even brush
it away but instead keep iron control. 48
In attempting to minimize confrontation, negotiators may also utilize subtlety
and indirection. For instance, during the 1973 normalization talks between China
and the United States, Chinese officials delicately suggested normalization
according to the "Japanese formula" without ever explaining exactly what this
might mean. 49 This tactic allowed the parties to avoid the difficult details of
dispute for a little while and moved the talks forward to attain a consensus over
general principles. Also, Chinese parties will often accept contracts without much
modification once a general agreement has been reached because of an aversion
to haggling over the details.5 0 Therefore, a dislike of personal conflict seems to
explain certain negotiation behavior. The Confucian goal of maintaining harmony
even during the settlement of disputes may affect the manner in which Chinese
and Koreans carry out negotiations.
A second affect of the concept of harmony lies in the way that negotiating
parties make decisions. Because of the importance of harmony within the
negotiating group, no individual can make a decision; instead, consensus is the
norm." No team member wants to risk being accused of "wild ambition"
(yexin)5 2 and so will consult with the other members of the group before making
any substantive change in bargaining position. Korean and Chinese negotiators
at the Korean War armistice talks exhibited this behavior by frequently recessing
the talks to caucus among themselves or to consult higher authority. 3 In
addition, in an empirical study Hofstede found this desire to make collective
decisions particularly striking when compared to more individualistic American
norms.5 4 Clearly, harmony has as important an influence within a negotiation
group as it does in shaping interactions between opposing parties. 5

47. Shenkar & Ronan, supra note 21, at 267; see C. JoY, supra note 16, at 10-11; CONFUCIUS,
supra note 45, at 135. "[Tlhe lack of self restraint in small matters will bring ruin to great plans." Id.
48. C. JoY, supra note 16, at 14.
49. Solomon, supra note 21, at 9.
50. Robinson & Doumar, "It is Better to Enter a Tiger's Mouth than a Court of Law" or Dispute
Resolution Alternatives in U.S.-China Trade, 5 DICK.J.INT'L L. 247, 256 (1987); Solomon, supra note
21, at 14.
51. KOREAN ETtQUETIE, supra note 21, at 92-93; Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 269.
52. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 269.
53. W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 218.
54. Hofstede, supra note 12, at 198.
55. Some scholars have raised another explanation for this emphasis on group decision making.
They argue that the bureaucratic structure of a government organization, where every decision is
scrutinized by higher officials, may cause the individual to spread responsibility among the group by
assuring consensus before taking action. See KOREAN ETIouErE, supra note 21, at 93; Lubman, supra
note 35, at 67. However, even the bureaucratic structure itself may have been designed by individuals
who value harmony and consensual decision making. It remains unclear which cause takes precedence.
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2. Friendship and Affiliation

The teachings of Confucius also prescribe a reliance on kinship affiliations
(guanxi) as the model to govern interpersonal relationships, 56 an idea closely
related to "harmony." Individuals tend to distrust impersonal or legalistic dealings,
preferring a moral link. For example, the traditional Chinese custom of sealing
a business arrangement involved only an oral agreement or a handshake instead
of a written contract. 58 Further, this model of relationships implies that people
following the Confucian tradition become cautious about requesting assistance
outside of kinship groups because the individuals incur reciprocal obligations
which may be undesired or may disrupt the harmony of the groups' interaction. 9
Individuals holding the traditional values therefore have anxiety about incurring
obligations that require real but unspecified future repayment.' Clearly, these
ideals of interpersonal behavior still affect negotiation proceedings.
One result of this Confucian outlook that commentators almost universally
recognize is that negotiators will try to build strong friendship bonds with their
opponents and will rely on these interpersonal bonds more than any contractual
terms to which the parties may agree.61 Observers note this belief in the
62
importance of the relationship in the Korean and Chinese contexts and in
empirical studies.6 For example, Chinese negotiators will seek a personal
relationship by using sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and breaks in negotiation
sessions to cultivate friendships. 65 They will also try to find out their
counterparts' tastes in food and politics.6 This helps to stimulate a more
intimate atmosphere and builds trust among individuals holding Confucian values.
Likewise, Chinese behavior regarding which United States envoy they prefer
to deal with reveals this belief in the importance of building relationships. The
PRC government has often made its preferences known as to the diplomat with
whom they would prefer to negotiate. In 1978, for example, Chinese leaders
expressed a preference for National Security Advisor Brzezinski over Secretary of

56. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 263 & 267; Solomon, supra note 21, at 3.
57. L. PYE, supra note 6, at 20; Solomon, supra note 21, at 3.
58. L. PYE, supra note 6, at 21.
59. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 271.
60. Id.
61. See sources cited infra notes 62, 63 & 64.
62. S. PARES, CROSSCURRENTS: KOREAN WESTERN CULTURE IN CONTRAST 116 (1985).
63. CHINESE ETIOUETTE, supra note 21, at 62; Robinson & Doumar, supra note 50, at 256 & 261;
Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 271.
64. R. TUNG, supra note 29, at 64. Pye suggests that a high level of mutual trust and respect is
necessary between any pair of negotiators and that the only uniquely Chinese feature of such
relationships is the way that they use it to try to manipulate opponents. L. PYE, supra note 6, at 32.
However, even this manipulation does not seem unique; Western negotiators also play upon personal
connections at times. What truly characterizes the negotiator schooled in Confucian values is the early
and continual stress placed upon such personal relationships.
65. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 271; Solomon, supra note 21, at 3.
66. Solomon, supra note 21, at 3.
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State Vance, whereas in 1981 they quickly sought Secretary of State Haig rather
than National Security Advisor Allen.67 The Confucian ideal of friendship
clearly affects the way that individuals approach negotiations.
Views about the role of negotiation itself are also affected by this
understanding of friendship. Chinese negotiators view the agreement reached at
the end of a bargaining session not as the end of the process, but as a step in the
development of an ongoing relationship.' Consequently, such parties do not
hesitate to reopen issues during negotiation that their foreign counterparts thought
had been definitively settled.6 9 For example, during the Panmunjom armistice
talks, the low level representatives worked for many hours to agree on the
geographical location for the demilitarized buffer zone."
After trading
concessions and finally developing a line, the Korean official then went back to
question sections that he had himself proposed.7 In addition, Chinese and
Korean parties expect the terms of a signed contract to be reevaluated or
renegotiated.72 Such revisions have even been proposed right after the signing
of a contract.73 Thus, under this view of negotiation, the substance of the
agreement reached is not nearly as important as the creation and testing of the
relationship between the parties.
This view of negotiation has practical consequences for the tactics favored
by individuals schooled in Confucian values. Because such negotiators do not
intend the negotiation to serve as a technical process which seeks to make the
parties' views converge but instead see the process as an "attempt to reconcile
principles and objectives and to test commitment" to the relationship, negotiators
tend to emphasize mutual interests rather than making concessions and
compromises on specific differences.74 Consequently, once negotiators feel that
they understand their opponents' intentions and that an agreement can be reached,
they often show great flexibility as to the details. 75 This action also obviates the
need for harmony-disrupting haggling.
Finally, the value placed on the relationship has another affect on bargaining
tactics. Because the Confucian scheme of friendship obliges one to help and favor
one's partner, Chinese negotiators use the principles upon which the relationship
is based to influence their opponents. 76 Chinese and Korean parties will use the
early stages of a meeting to establish their mutual interests in the form of agreed

67. Id. at 7.
68. CHINESE ETIQUETrE, supra note 21, at 123; L. PYE, supra note 6, at 78; Weiss, supra note
38, at 185 & 193.
69. Solomon, supra note 21, at 14-15.
70. C. JOY, supra note 16, at 130-31.
71. Id.
72. CHINESE ETIQuErrE, supra note 21, at 116.
73. L. PYE, supra note 6, at 78.
74. Id. at 77; Solomon, supra note 21, at 6.
75. Solomon, supra note 21, at 6.
76. Id. at 3-4; CHINESE ETIOiUEriE, supra note 21, at 115 & 121.
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general principles." They then raise these principles later in the bargaining
process as a form of obligation that their new "friends" should follow and may
accuse them of betraying the spirit of their relationship if they do not agree.78
For example, in 1972 President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai signed the
Shanghai Communique, a declaration of friendship that began the process for
This
normalization of diplomatic relations finally achieved in 1978. 79
communique served as the framework for the following six years of talks. 80
Subsequently, however, the Chinese cited the agreement to criticize U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan as against the spirit of the relationship between the two
countries.8 This idea of an obligation created by an expression of friendship
rather than the terms of a contract may also be seen in the PRC's recently
published 13-volume "treaty series.""2 This collection contains more than one
hundred joint announcements, communiques, and declarations which would never
qualify as "treaties" under the Western understanding.8 3 Clearly, the government
of the PRC regards these joint declarations as evidence of obligation despite their
explicit labels of "parallel unilateral declarations," for instance, instead of
"agreements."
Finally, Jong-Hwan, a South Korean observer, reveals this view of obligation
By agreeing in
when he criticizes the North Korean government's tactics.'
principle to discuss economic conflicts and later refusing to enter further
negotiations without settlement of the military differences, the North Korean
government lacks "integrity" in Jong-Hwan's eyes.8" Clearly, the obligations of
a relationship based on agreed principles played a roll in his perception of the
proper manner in which to negotiate. On the whole, the Confucian ideal of
friendship and affiliation affects views of the negotiation process, its role in
settling disputes, and the tactics utilized by negotiators.8 6

77. See, e.g., Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 634.
78. Solomon, supra note 21, at 4; see, e.g., Kazuo, How the "Inscrutables"Negotiate with the
"Inscrutables": Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-a-vis the Japanese, 79 CHINA Q. 529, 530 & 544
(1979).
79. Solomon, supra note 21, at 7.
80. Id.
81. Id.; L. PYE, supra note 6, at ix.
82. See Wang, supra note 5, at 101-02.
83. Id.
84. Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 644-45.
85. Id.
86. Solomon, although a strong proponent of the tactic of friendship and obligation, adds one
caveat: "When Chinese officials want to reach a specific agreement, they will set aside their stress on
principle and reach a concrete understanding that in fact may have little relation to-or may even seem
to contravene-the principles they stressed early in the negotiation." Solomon, supra note 21, at 4.
However, simply because overwhelming national interest can overcome tendencies toward emphasizing
principle, the underlying importance of principle and obligation remains intact.
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3. Hierarchy and Face
Growing out of the Confucian values of group consciousness and harmony
is an intertwining set of ideas loosely labeled "hierarchy" or "face." Hierarchy
posits that each individual is conscious of her position in the social system; this
knowledge prevents her from overreaching her position and disrupting the
harmony of the society.87 Closely related to this concept, face measures the
individual's prestige or reputation within a group (mien-tzu or lien), helping to
define her social status.88 People influenced by these Confucian ideals tend to
regard social status within society as important and strongly dislike being shamed
or snubbed by others. 89 This group of values can affect the tactics, progress, and
outcomes of negotiation.
First, the concept of face influences negotiator's choice of tactics. Chinese
negotiators, for instance, will always request that their opponents fully express
their position before the Chinese reveal their views. 90 This tactic not only allows
the negotiator to learn the status level of her opponent if it were not already
known, but it protects her superiors from confrontational encounters with lower
level foreign officials that would tend to infringe on their need for face.91 In
addition, Chinese negotiators will try to use shame, or loss of face, to gain
concessions and put their opponents on the defensive. For example, in 1975 Deng
Xioping tried to advance the normalization talks by asserting that president Nixon
had not fulfilled his publicly announced intention to establish full diplomatic
ties. 92 The Chinese leader in essence tried to shame Nixon by pointing out his
lack of good faith.93 Thus, the Chinese have developed tactics not only to
protect face but also to use it as a tool to try to manipulate opponents.
Hierarchy may also affect the progress of negotiations. The status of
opponents may be quite important; Chinese and Korean negotiators feel less
comfortable forming the necessary friendly relationship with individuals of
different perceived status.94 Often a correct pairing of status levels may engender
bonding and allow much more rapid conclusion of an agreement. For example,
when technical experts from the PRC and the United States meet, mutual respect
comes much more easily than between, for example, Chinese government officials
and American business executives. 95 Chinese scientists are accustomed to a high

87. Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 263, 266, 267-70.
88. Wang, supra note 5, at 106-07; see C. JOY, supra note 16, at 1.
89. KOREAN EnTQuErrE, supra note 21, at 88; S. PARES, supra note 62, at 117; Wang, supra note
5, at 107.
90. Solomon, supra note 21, at 8-9; Kazuo, supra note 78, at 541.
91. Solomon, supra note 21, at 9.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id.; see L. PYE, supra note 6, at 42-43. Whether this tactic works on those who do not share
the Confucian ideas of status and shame (especially Nixon!) is another issue.
94. See, e.g., S. PARES, supra note 62, at 117.
95. Lubman, supra note 35, at 63.
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status position in their society, so they tend to more readily respect their American
counterparts.' Thus, status equality aids in the negotiation process.
Finally, perceptions of face and status may shape the outcomes of
negotiation. Individuals may find certain positions favored by opposing parties
untenable because of personal calculations of status and loss of face. A complex
example of this reality occurred in 1898 during the talks over the British
acquisition of Hong Kong.97 The British government desired that China make
a complete cession of the island and the peninsula next to it outright.98 The
Chinese officials, however, managed to achieve an agreement in which it leased
the island to Britain without payment for ninety nine years and China maintained
jurisdiction over Kowloon City on the peninsula. 99 They insisted on this
arrangement because the emperor felt that he would lose too much face with his
people if he ceded a government installation (Kowloon City) gained by his
predecessor or if he charged rent for the property, and that he would lose
international prestige if he ceded the land outright.'0' Thus, the constraints of
perceived status shaped the settlement into the form of a lease but prevented any
payment of rent.
4. History
Closely linked to the idea of status is the role of perceptions of history.
Western nations historically treated China and Korea as subordinate, uncivilized
countries, primarily useful as markets for their industrial goods and sources of raw
materials. These societies view this treatment as a loss of face on the national
level, and they desire to correct the status imbalance.
This view of history shapes negotiation behavior by increasing the importance
of certain goals and by creating a distrust of international law. First, correcting
the imbalance of the Western colonial system has become an overriding goal. For
example, the regaining of Hong Kong has huge symbolic importance as a way of
erasing the humiliation of the last century,'' and this perception makes it an
extremely important goal for negotiations.
On the other hand, Robinson points out that the Western nations' historic
abuse of international law has made the PRC wary of relying on it in
negotiations.'o z For example, China repeatedly asked Queen Victoria in the
1800's to restrain her citizens' opium trade under principles of international
law.' O3 Britain responded with the Opium War (1839-42) and smuggling

96. Id. See generally CHINESE ETIQUETTE, supra note 21, at 122.
97. Wang, supra note 5, at 108-09.
98. Id. at 109.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Weiss, supra note 38, at 180.
Robinson & Doumar, supra note 50, at 250-51; see also Solomon, supra note 21, at 4.
Robinson & Doumar, supra note 50, at 250-51.
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increased." ° As a result, the PRC may be less ready to accept international law
terms in negotiations and will be less likely to rely on tenets of international law
to restrain opponents.
5. Patience
The stereotypical Oriental patience may in fact have some basis in traditional
Chinese and Korean culture. 5 Related to the idea of harmony, these societies
had a looser idea of time. The Chinese word for "tomorrow," for example, did not
necessarily mean the next day but instead the less precise "some time in the near
future.""° More importantly, unlike the values generated by the Protestant work
ethic, these societies did not necessarily associate the passage of time with the loss
of money.' °7 Numerous observers recognized this cultural outlook'0° and an
empirical study has confirmed it."° In addition, when the Korean War armistice
talks concluded in 1953, they were the longest negotiations of their kind in history,
spanning 575 regular meetings." 0 Obviously, patience alone did not cause these
talks to continue for so long, but only negotiators or leaders with a fair measure
of patience would adopt this strategy. The value placed on patience may allow
Chinese and Korean negotiators to be more flexible during negotiations and even
extract greater concessions from their less patient opponents."'
Chinese negotiators use this patience as a tactic in circumstances where some
factor blocks full agreement. Solomon reports, for example, that Chinese officials
have often used stalling tactics when immediate closure might be unfavorable to
their position or deadlock would occur." 2 Western negotiators, of course, also
use this tactic when expedient, but Chinese negotiators seem to rely on it to a
greater extent." 3 A second example of this lack of concern for speed occurred
during a business negotiation between low level cadres and western business
executives. When an impasse in the bargaining occurred, the Chinese official
responded that although the law at the time did not permit the proposed

104. Id.
105. See, e.g., CoNFucIus, supra note 45, at 74. "The Master said, 'In serving your father and
mother you ought to dissuade them from doing wrong in the gentlest way. If you see your advice
being ignored, you should not become disobedient but remain reverent. You should not complain even
if in so doing you wear yourself out.'" Id.
106. CHINESE ETouErrE, supra note 21, at 124-25.
107. Id.
108. CHINESE ETIQUETT, supra note 21, at 115; L. PYE, supra note 6, at 73; Kazuo, supra note
78, at 546; Robinson & Doumar, supra note 50, at 256; Solomon, supra note 21, at 13-14.
109. R. TUNG, supra note 29, at 64.
110. W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 1.
111. Solomon, supra note 21, at 14.
112. Id. at 9 and 14.
113. See id.
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agreement, a change was expected in four years." 4 The Chinese negotiator
thought it reasonable to go ahead with the agreement in the hope that when the
change occurred, the deal could go through.1 1 5 Thus, the cultural emphasis on
patience may prove to be a distinct advantage in gaining concessions from one's
opponents, but it may create difficulties when it conflicts with the speed with
which Western business is accustomed to run." 6
B. The Effects of PoliticalIdeology on Negotiation Behavior
1. Domination Ideal
A school of thought very different from the "cultural heritage" school argues
that the potent effects of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrines have had a significant
impact on the very concept of negotiation and the legitimacy of various
tactics."" These effects stem from the basic Soviet way of looking at the
world-either socialism or capitalism will dominate the globe; they cannot coexist
because of their antithetical nature." 8 However, this outlook becomes tempered
by a certain degree of Soviet pragmatism that allows a choice of tools in the
struggle for control," 9 and Chinese communists agree that compromise might
be acceptable if it does not become so extreme as to constitute capitulation. 2
The impact of this pragmatism is that the Chinese and North Korean governments
believe that negotiation1 2with the West remains possible, but they view it as part
of the overall struggle '
Negotiation, under this conception, is another weapon for the domination of
opponents, not a means to exchange concessions for the mutual benefit of the
parties. For example, early in the life of the Soviet Union, Lenin granted foreign
economic concessions because of the weak bargaining position of his country, but
he stated that "the concessions . .. which we are forced to grant, are the
continuation of war in another form, by other means." 22 Dean Acheson

114. Interview with Robert M. Downing, Head of Pacific Operations, Rohm & Haas, Inc. (March
31, 1991).
115. Id.
116. Some commentators claim that some of the lack of speed of Chinese negotiators may be
attributed to the clumsy bureaucratic structure within which they make many decisions. L. PYE, supra
note 6, at 49; see W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 218; ComparativeApproaches to Negotiations with
the People's Republic of China, AM. J. INT'L L., Sept. 1972, at 117 [hereinafter Comparative
Approaches] (Comments of S. Lubman). However, one must question whether this bureaucratic
organization itself might have been designed differently if time were valued more highly. C.f supra
note 55.
117. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
118. Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 621.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id. at 619-20; W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 20 (quoting Lenin); Yin, supra note 17, at 13
(quoting Khrushchev).
122. See Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 620.
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confirmed this assessment: "In Communist doctrine, [negotiation] was war by
political means to achieve an end unacceptable to the other side." '2
Commentators argue that this view of negotiation holds true for North Korea as
well. 24 While the fervency of this political position may no longer hold the
importance it did at the height of the cold war, this ideological perception of the
concept of negotiation influences both the goals and tactics of negotiators.
Communist ideology legitimates one alternate goal that is unrelated to the
settlement of disputes-the spread of propaganda. By entering negotiations, these
governments can spread information about their ideas and goals to a much wider
and potentially more receptive audience. 1"
Chinese and North Korean6
12
negotiators had this goal throughout much of the Panmunjom armistice talks.
For example, Admiral Joy argues that because the North Korean refused to meet
at any location other than in the North Korean controlled zone, they made it
appear that the United Nations forces needed to seek a cease fire. 27 The North
Koreans then exploited this appearance, despite their frail military condition, to
raise the morale of their troops and gain credibility on the world press. Another
instance of using negotiation for propaganda purposes arose at the fall of the Park
government in South Korea.' 28 The North Korean negotiating team government
quickly opened talks in the hope that stirring unrest in the south would support
political factions that it would prefer, but when a new government formed along
29
much the same lines as the Park regime, it once again shunned negotiations.
Thus, the communist governments have not hesitated to use negotiation for goals
13
other than the traditional Western one of settling disputes.
Another non-tradition goal sought by communist negotiators lies in the use
of delay in order to succeed militarily. Mao exhibited this goal, a purpose outside
of the context of the negotiations, when he opened talks with Jiang Kai-shek in
1945.'31 Mao did not intend to peacefully settle his disputes with his opponent,
but merely sought time to build up the military strength of his forces so as to oust
Jiang.132 Arguably, North Korea also used negotiations for a similar purpose.
Labeled "fight-talk-fight-talk," the drawn-out negotiations and their associated

123. Id.
124. See, e.g., NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17, at 159; Jong-Hwan, supra note 8,

at 628.
125. See, e.g., C. JOY, supra note 16, at 5-8; NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17, at
44; C. YIN, NEGOTIATIONS INAN ERA OF NEGOTIATION 36-38, 39-40 (1973); Jong-Hwan, supra note
8, at 655; J. Weiss, supra note 38, at 180.
126. See, e.g., C. JOY, supra note 16, at 1-3.
127. Id. at 2.
128. NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17, at 163; see also Jong-Hwan, supra note 8,
at 633-34.
129. NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17, at 163.
130. Of course, Western governments occasionally use negotiation for similar propaganda
purposes, but this seems far less common and is generally regarded as devious and illegitimate.
131. Yin, supra note 17, at 16.
132. Id.
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cease-fires allowed the North Korean government to reinvigorate and secretly
resupply its troops.133 These two goals, propaganda and seeking military
advantage, arise from and are justified by the ideology of total struggle.
In addition to alternative goals, certain tactics also receive legitimation by the
communist ideological outlook. The overriding goal of the struggle against
Imperialism appears to create an attitude of the ends justifying the means. When
communist negotiators first used these revolutionary tactics, they shocked Western
opponents who promptly labeled them dishonorable 134 and "despicable." 35
One example of these methods arose when negotiators would lie or distort the
truth, even in the face of strongly contradictory evidence. For instance, North
Korean officials understated, in a completely unrealistic way, the number of
prisoners of war that they held. 3 6 In addition, they put forward extortionary
demands. For example, North Korean negotiators demanded a major change in
the laws of South Korea and a preferential military settlement before they would
even discuss the reuniting of families separated by the armistice line. 37
A third non-traditional method lies in attempts to physically intimidate
opponents. Negotiators would use implicit threats, such as when North Korea
marched heavily armed troops through a supposedly neutral, demilitarized
conference area in Panmunjom.13' Finally, a collection of tactics seems to exist
that American negotiators would not consider blatantly illegitimate but that seem
relevant here because they fit the pattern of the more revolutionary methods.
These tactics include the use of late sessions and fatigue to pressure or disorient
opponents, 3 9 time deadlines to force agreement,14 agenda items containing
substantive conclusions in the hope of biasing outcomes,' 4 ' and concessions on
spurious issues in attempts to gain concessions on material issues.' 42 Thus, the
ideology of communism, in its attempts to dominate its imperialist foes, opened
up whole new areas of negotiation goals and tactics.
2. Patience
Not only does patience have a traditional basis in Chinese culture 4 3 but
some elements of political ideology also support it. Lenin, for example,

133. See C. JOY, supra note 16, at 71-73, 88; Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 627.

134. W.

VATCHER,

supra note 16, at 205.

135. C. JOY, supra note 16, at 146.
136. Id. at 104; see also W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 213 & 215; Jong-Hwan, supra note 8,
at 637.
137. Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 637; see also NATIONAL UNIFICATION BOARD, supra note 17,
at 159; Chang, supra note 35, at 270-71; Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 656.
138. C. JOY, supra note 16, at 30; see also id. at 3 & 5.
139. Solomon, supra note 21, at 10.
140. C. YIN, supra note 125, at 42-43.
141. C. JOY, supra note 16, at 18-19.
142. Id. at 89-90.
143. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
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encouraged tenacity in his negotiators, stating that they "must be patient ... Once
you have gone into the business of negotiation, it is impossible to get nervous and
fall into despair ... That would not be proletarian."'" Jong-Hwan confirmed
this assessment of Soviet negotiators as persevering in negotiations no matter how
unpleasant. 141 In this way, patience becomes part of the mentality of struggle
against opposing ideologies-the side that holds on the longest will win.
Chinese and Korean negotiators have expressed this patience both by refusing
make
concessions until the other side capitulates and by repeating the same
to
demands, wearying opponents.' An example of the former occurred during the
Panmunjom armistice talks when North Korea officials refused to accede to the
term of a cease fire proposal that prohibited either side from rebuilding damaged
airfields during the pause in hostilities. The North had no useable aircraft, so it
hoped to constrain the ability of the U.N. forces to use transport planes to
resupply.147 Putting forth the disingenuous argument that such a provision
would interfere in the North's "internal affairs," negotiators stubbornly held onto
their position.' 48 After a long period of waiting, Washington finally ordered the
U.N. representatives to make this concession.1 49 During the Paris peace talks
to end the Vietnam war, communist negotiators also used patience to force
concessions from their opponents." 0 They kept repeating their unchanged
demands over a long period of time in the hope that domestic pressure in the U.S.
would force a capitulation.' 5' Thus, although the patience exhibited by these
negotiators may have cultural roots, a better explanation in these situations of
ideological fervor may be the perseverance advocated by communist thinkers in
pursuing the struggle against imperialism.
3. Principle
Communist ideology suggests a very different conception of "principle" from
that associated with notions of harmony and kinship affiliations. 2 Instead of
a basic understanding to which the parties agree on which to base a relationship,
principle in this context concerns ideals internal to the communist negotiator which
serve to restrict the scope of possible agreements. Communist officials remain
unable to compromise on certain points because of the overriding ideals of
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.'53 These restrictions relate fundamentally to

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Yin, supra note 17, at 27.
Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 622-23.
See, e.g., C. JOY, supra note 16, at 72-73; Yin, supra note 17, at 28.
C. JOY, supra note 16, at 72-73.
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 39-40.
Yin, supra note 17, at 28; see also W. VATCHER, supra note 16, at 212.
Yin, supra note 17, at 28.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Jong-Hwan, supra note 8, at 622-23, 627-28.
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the communist view of the struggle between opposing ideologies.' 54 Negotiation
may be used as an alternate tool to violent revolution, but if negotiation gives up
communism's fundamental principles, it loses its legitimation as part of the overall
struggle. Thus, whereas Americans view compromise as allowing the negotiator
to alter policy for political benefits, a Chinese negotiator might react very hostilely
to the suggestion that she needs to make concessions on subjects she considers
fundamental.' 55 Thus, ideological notions of principle can have concrete effects
within the context of a negotiation.
C. The Relationships Between Ideology and Cultural Tradition
1. Reinforcing
Both ideological and cultural explanations reinforce certain negotiating
behavior. One example of this convergence lies in the patience of negotiators.
Although quite different sources support this tendency, the practical effect at the
bargaining table remains exactly the same: an increased ability to extract
concessions from opponents, especially those who operate on shorter time scales
or who do not possess this proclivity towards patience.
Another pair of causes that seem to result in the same behavior is the desire
to regain "face" for perceived historical subordination and the desire to dominate
opposing ideologies. The convergence of these inclinations helps to explain the
tremendous importance placed on the regaining of Hong Kong. By taking over
this territory, the PRC not only begins to erase the humiliation of the domination
by nineteenth century Western powers, but it scores an ideological and propaganda
victory in the struggle against Imperialism. Thus, where the background factors
of cultural tradition and ideology coincide, one can expect an even greater impact
on negotiation behavior. 5
2. Similar but Diverging
Both cultural traditions and communist ideology have a conception of the
importance of principle, but differences between the views suggest differing
implications for negotiation behavior. Both of these groups of explanatory factors
place greater importance on ideas of principle in guiding negotiators and in setting
overall goals than an American negotiator might display, especially an American
negotiating a business deal. However, the ideological view of principle tends to
restrict the range of agreements that a negotiation might achieve, and ideological
principle itself remains relatively static over time. For example, the Party's view
on a particular subject, or the mentality of a general struggle against capitalism,

154.
155.
156.
levels of

Id.
See ComparativeApproaches, supra note 116, at 109 (Comments of R. Clough).
See, for example, the universal observation that Chinese and Korean negotiators show high
patience. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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tends to change only at a glacial pace. Negotiators guided by these goals may not
be able to accept certain agreements that conflict with these principles, and may
not be persuaded by certain arguments. By contrast, the cultural view of principle
as the mutual. interests that provide a foundation for relationships does not restrict
conflict resolution but in fact engenders it. Principles in this respect can evolve
when the policies and goals of the bargaining party change, allowing successful
negotiations where before no agreement could be reached. These essentially
different natures, therefore do not fortify one another.
Another way of looking at this distinction is to examine the basic
contradiction between the Confucian ideals of harmony and of the development
of friendship relationships within which to work, and the communistic principles
of struggle and domination. In order to build the real bonds of friendship required
by the Confucian idea of negotiation, a negotiator must set aside communism's
single-minded search for domination.
Trends in the PRC after Mao's death, although turbulent, suggest that the
PRC has reduced its emphasis on ideological principle, and North Korea may
follow this lead. 57 In 1978, for example, the Eleventh People's Congress
announced the official abandonment of political upheavals such as the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and more pragmatic officials have assumed
high government posts as part of the move away from the dominance of
ideology. 58
The subordination of ideology also became apparent in the Macao talks, in
which Chinese negotiators made concessions in order to gain a successful
agreement. 59 Chang states that the "Macao dispute shows China will be flexible
and pragmatic in making concessions it feels necessary to accomplish its
objectives, even if this requires significant departure from precedent and previous
stated positions."' 6 Finally, even North Korea has recently shown remarkable
shifts in its bargaining with the South Korean government, and on December 13,
1991, the two nations signed a treaty of reconciliation and non-aggression.' 6'
Further negotiations to reduce tensions followed the gains made with the initial
treaty. 62 These trends suggest that perhaps Chinese and Korean negotiators not

157. See L. PYE, supra note 6, at 20 & 32; R. TUNG, supra note 29, at 9-10; Shenkar & Ronen,
supra note 21, at 264-65.
158. R. TUNG, supra note 29, at 9-10; Shenkar & Ronen, supra note 21, at 264-65.
159. See Chang, supra note 35, at 276.
160. Id. One can, of course, argue that these concessions do not contradict the ideological goal
of spreading communism and therefore fit within the communist idea of compromise, but the flexibility
with which the PRC approached the talks seems a significant shift from previous negotiations.
161. Sanger, Koreas Sign Pact Renouncing Force in Step to Unity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1991,
at Al, col. 2.
162. See Lee Su-wan, North Korea to Sign NuclearAccord on Thursday, Reuters, Jan. 29, 1992
(news service available in LEXIS, Nexis Library); Stormont, After FourDecades of Hate, Koreans
Seek Rapprochement, Reuters, Dec. 14, 1991 (news service available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
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only will make reference to ideology less often163 but will reveal less of its
influence in their tactics and goals.
3. Contradicting
A contradiction exists between the ideological justification for certain tactics
and the idea of face or integrity. The mindset of the struggle for domination
allows the ends to justify the means, making such tactics as lying, intimidation,
and extortionary demands acceptable tools for the negotiator. Yet these ideas
conflict with the building of relationships between the parties, an important goal
of a negotiator schooled in the Confucian value of friendship and affiliation. Once
again, however, the emphasis on ideological domination seems to be slightly less
important, and the more traditional values have resurfaced.
Americans will not hear Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric from Chinese
negotiators, even if the Chinese bureaucracy and press continue to use it
internally.' 6' Solomon also argues that the Chinese now seek to "preserve their
credibility by avoiding hollow bluffs and outright lies,"' 65 even if they may still
distort prior statements and understandings to their advantage. 16
Perhaps a shift in the countries' national interests may explain this shift in
tactics. In the 1950's when the Chinese used negotiations to advance their
military positions, any tactic seemed justified. 167 Now, however, when the PRC
needs technology and business relationships, it must deal with the West in part on
its own terms. The ideological goal of strengthening the nation in order to
preserve communism is now fulfilled using less revolutionary tactics.
III. BARRIERS TO SETTLEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATION
It seems intuitively obvious that negotiations between individuals of different
cultures will encounter greater difficulties and take longer to reach agreements.
An enormous number of factors may inhibit the settlement of a dispute. For
example, parties can never easily communicate their needs to each other, even
6
when they have an extensive background of shared values and experience.' 8
In fact, studies show that the greater the similarities of perception and behavior
between opposing parties, the more readily they can reach agreement. 69
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Therefore, differences in nationality and culture can only add to differences found
between individuals within a culture.
A cultural dimension may even exist in the way that parties view the
negotiation encounter itself.170 However, cultural differences per se do not
interfere with negotiation; instead it is how these differences impact on
communication between the parties and on the choice of tactics that causes barriers
to settlement.17 ' This section tries to ascribe specific difficulties encountered to
causes found in the negotiators' cultural heritage and ideology.
A. Harmony
The importance placed on harmony and consensus can create communication
difficulties and prevent the development of creative solutions. First, part of the
ideal of harmony concerns preventing emotional displays and open conflict
between the parties. Generally, suppression of emotion can prove valuable,
allowing negotiators to focus on issues instead of being distracted by outbursts and
shifts of emotion. 172 However, if foreigners do not follow the courteous and
respectful norm (keqi) expected of them, their behavior can become quite
disruptive. 73 Chinese negotiators tend to react negatively to overtly aggressive
behavior and may not consider impoliteness as a mere oversight, but as an
insult. 74 The common Western approach of admitting the differences between
the parties' positions so as to promote "honest confrontation" might easily
backfire.175 Thus, a lack of understanding of the Chinese desire for harmony
during talks can cause frictions that may prevent a mutually beneficial agreement.
A second pitfall caused by this desire for harmony lies in the modes of
communication used by negotiators. Chinese or Korean individuals may use
subtle gestures or oblique suggestions to convey meaning rather than openly
stating information or feelings that might cause disruption. For instance, American
negotiators may not recognize that silence or lack of eye contact in their opponents
need not indicate disapproval. 6 If they acted on their usual interpretation of
these appearances, negotiations might founder needlessly. In a more subtle
example, Premier Zhou Enlai quoted a poem written by Mao concerning the
evanescence of life. 77 This act has since been understood to express Zhou's
recognition of his own failing health, a subject he would be uncomfortable to raise
openly. 78 Zhou died several years later of cancer. 79 Chinese officials have
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made other such subtle references that may have an impact on the progress of
negotiation;" 8 if their American counterparts fail to recognize them, once again
settlement may be jeopardized.
The desire for harmony within a negotiating group may also have a negative
impact on bargaining outcomes. Inventing creative options proves extremely
valuable to settling many disputes.'81 However, the requirement of consensus
within many working groups stifles individual initiative.'82 This lack of
consensus may well explain some of the difficulties and slowness experienced by
negotiations involving Chinese and Korean negotiators, but its exact impact
remains very difficult to calculate or even detect.
B. Friendshipand Affiliation
Although the building of strong relationships has many positive side-effects,
the stress placed upon such bonds by Chinese and Korean negotiators may cause
misunderstanding and inhibit the reaching of agreements. In terms of positive
effects, perhaps the best way to solve the problem of the lack of similar
experience and values of the negotiators, even within one culture, is to build a
strong working relationship between the parties. 8 3 The Chinese emphasis on
such relationships can also help to save a contract. Because of the long term bond
created during negotiation, an American business partner might not feel that it
needs to respond to its counterpart's failure to live up to a contract provision. The
foreigner can trust her Chinese "friend" to make up for any minor shortcomings
later, and the American has greater inclination to settle disputes so as not to risk
the overall relationship. 84 In fact, in 1987 over fifty billion dollars of trade
occurred between the PRC and the United States without a single dispute rising
to the level of a formal law suit. 85 Despite these benefits, differing views of
the nature of the relationship itself and of the necessity for written contracts can
cause misunderstandings.
First, differing views of the negotiators' relationship may disrupt an otherwise
stable agreement. Individuals who value the Confucian model of friendship
perceive obligations on the parties that foreigners may not recognize. For
example, the American paradigm of a stable relationship seeks strict compliance
and predictability after signing a contract." A Chinese partner, however, might
regard a relationship as setting up obligations on the part of the American, and
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would not hesitate to ask small favors."8 7 Such requests, in turn, might arouse
irritation in the American or even accusations of bad faith. On the other hand, the
notion of friendship might create expectations in the Chinese official of deserving
such special favors or attention. Ill feelings might arise if the American fails to
fulfill these perceived obligations.'" Pye states that the concept of friendship
can lead to "exaggerated expectations of dependency, that, if not satisfied, can
cause angry reactions and feelings of having been mistreated."' 89
Differing emphasis placed on the relationship and the written expression of
it may also create difficulties. Chinese negotiators tend to trust a working
relationship more than a contract or treaty that arises from it. 9' This opposite
view of the general Western perspective caused misunderstandings when Zhou
Enlai entered negotiations with the United States over the 1954 Geneva treaty
governing Indochina, a treaty which the U.S. would not sign. 9' Zhou convinced
the U.S. government to agree to unilaterally declare that it would not interfere with
the treaty's provisions. 192 Although the United States regarded this action as a
mere declaration of policy, the PRC then persistently claimed that the U.S. was
bound by the 1954 Geneva agreements. 93 The negotiated settlement came to
nothing when the United States changed its policy in 1960 and increased its
military presence in Vietnam. 4
Differing views of the importance of contracts and relational bonds also
creates difficulties in business negotiations. When bargaining over a contract, for
example, Chinese negotiators do not like to consider the possibility of the break
up of the relationship, 95 and if they do agree to assigning responsibilities after
a breach, they prefer general, uncertain terms.196 The standard arbitration clause
recommended by the Chinese National Technology Import Corporation simply
states that both parties must try to correct unsatisfactory results and jointly work
Obviously, American
out the consequences should the contract fail. 197
businesses regard this kind of general statement as completely inadequate. In
addition, each side may waste much time trying to educate the other as to the level
of specificity and the ultimate form of the contract.' 98 American negotiators in
Thus, different
particular find this need for explanation frustrating."
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conceptions of the role of contracts, as well as differing ideas on levels of
specificity in contracts, can cause barriers to successfully concluding negotiations.
C. Hierarchy and Face
Individuals who hold a concept of hierarchy tend to prefer not to associate
with others who have lower status levels, 2°° and this preference can prevent the
formation of the trusting relationship necessary for successful negotiations.
Because lawyers traditionally held a very low status and were persecuted during
the Cultural Revolution along with all intellectuals, 2 1 perceptions of the status
levels of many foreign representatives may hinder negotiation. Although changes
since Mao's death made the use of lawyers more legitimate,2 2 and the
recognition that other cultures may assign status to members in different ways has
become more widespread, status consciousness may still limit the ease with which
negotiation relationships form.
Ideas of status and face may also affect the ways in which negotiators go
about building friendships. Just as important as not injuring another's reputation
is the idea of giving face: small gestures or comments of respect may fulfill a
Chinese negotiator's desire for status recognition. 20 3 Americans in particular
have trouble giving face; although flattery exists between Americans, they often
regard it as mere pretense or feel guilty about pumping another's ego. 2 4
However, failing to show the customary signs of respect will cause offense or
inhibit the formation of positive relationships.
D. Ideology
An inherent difficulty in evaluating barriers to negotiation arises due to
difficulties in defining the roles and purposes of negotiation under communist
ideologies. One can hardly explicate the barriers to settling disputes through
negotiation if one side does not view the resolution of conflict as a goal of the
process. 2 5 For example, North Korea may have entered the Panmunjom
armistice talks without any intention of reaching a peace settlement, but merely
sought to regain military initiative. 2° Consequently, the war and its loss of life
dragged on for many years.
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However, assuming that Chinese and Korean representatives in fact want to
settle disputes, communist ideology can prevent the success of such negotiations
because of disruptive tactics and failures to communicate. First, ideology justified
the use of tactics designed to create tensions and intimidate, and these pressures
may inhibit resolution of differences.20 7 Not only do these actions prevent the
creation of a sense of trust and commitment between the parties, but the tensions
they create may militate against reaching an agreement. Psychological studies
show that negotiators faced with .pressure become less capable of evaluating
information and making the fine discriminations necessary to achieving
agreement. 2° They may resist compromise, and are more likely to overreact to
provocations, leading to the break down of bargaining.2" Clearly, although
negotiators using these tactics may believe they gain an advantage by intimidating
opponents, perhaps a propaganda advantage, such actions do not promote the
settlement of substantive problems.
In addition to creating tensions, ideological differences can create difficulties
in communication. For example, although Chinese officials understand that
American companies need to make a profit, they cannot empathize with this need
because their own drives and goals differ to such a great extent. 2 0 They may
perceive the American company as merely being greedy. 21 ' Because each side
cannot clearly understand the other's interests, they find it more difficult to create
a mutually beneficial settlement.21 2 Attempts to posture for propaganda purposes
also inhibit open and successful communication. 2 a If negotiators speak for the
benefit of third parties instead of addressing each other, understanding of issues
becomes less likely, and negotiations tend to break down. 214' Thus, although
ideological goals may justify the use of negotiations to spread ideas and influence
world opinion, they hinder the resolution of conflicts, the ostensible subject of
such meetings.
Finally, ideology may create special needs that other parties may have
difficulty perceiving and therefore fulfilling. For example, before 1979, PRC
negotiators saw firms with operations in Taiwan as dealing with the enemy.215
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After the PRC formulated the "Two Chinas" concept in 1979, in which it began
to treat Taiwan less hostilely, firms which stopped dealing with Taiwan were
chastised.216 If American negotiators fail to recognize and cater to the
ideological needs of their counterparts, they may not reach agreement.217
IV. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Many of the problems in communication and the disruptions to smooth
negotiation sessions would decrease in importance if the two parties had a better
understanding of the culture and needs of their counterparts. For example, an
American negotiator should not try to single out one counterpart in the negotiation
for a one-on-one talk or special treatment. The rest of the negotiating team would
lose face due to this favoritism, and the chance of an amicable settlement would
decline.21 8 An American negotiator cognizant of the cultural traditions of face
and consensual decision making would not make the same error. Many studies
support this notion that increased understanding of one's opponents facilitates
dispute settlement,2 1 9 including one citing it as a "necessary condition" for
success. 221 Clearly, an increased understanding of one's opponents increases the
chances of successfully resolving a negotiation.
Effort put into building a trusting and committed relationship will also
improve results in these inter-cultural contexts. Not only do traditional Confucian
values favor this path, but a strong bond helps to smooth over frictions caused by
cultural misunderstandings and allows the parties to communicate their real
interests. Presenting issues, for example, in a broad, principled framework may
suggest to Chinese and Korean opponents that an American desires a long term
relationship and demonstrates a seriousness of purpose. 21 Tung's empirical
research confirms this assessment: the willingness to put time into building a
strong relationship was the most important factor in predicting the success of
cross-cultural business negotiations between Chinese and Americans. 2
To a certain extent many of the problems discussed in this comment will
diminish as more negotiations between individuals with these differing cultural and
ideological backgrounds occur. 223 Greater sensitivity to the other's culture will
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develop over time, and solutions of such practical problems as the form of
contracts will be found and standardized. Yet cultural influences inherently resist
change. The problems of cross-cultural negotiation will persist, and members of
both cultures will continue to grapple with them in search of answers.
RICHARD W. DOWNING2 24
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